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MOBILISING AMERICA

By
ARTHUR
BULLARD


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MOBILISING AMERICA

BY

ARTHUR BULLARD

Author of

"The Diplomacy of the Great War," etc.

UNIV. OF CALIFORNIA

New York

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PREFACE

No American who has lived in France or England, as I have these last two years, and has watched them struggling with the problem of organising democracy to resist the impact of war, could help feeling at every minute that some time we might have to meet the same problems. Day after day experiments were being made, some successful, some failures, the lessons of which would be of value to us if ever we had to mobilise. And so — anticipating plenty of time to mature my notes — I set to work gathering the preliminary data for a book on "How Democracies Mobilise." It promised to be a bulky tome, there was so much which seemed noteworthy.

But War is already upon us. And so I have tried to summarise in this short space the main points I had intended to develop at length.

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It would be quite impossible to list even the bare names of all those in France and England to whom I am indebted for advice, suggestion and criticism. Whatever clear thinking there is in the book is the fruit of much discussion with people who were in a position to know more than I of the various phases of the problem.

This is especially true of the section dealing with the Censorship and Publicity. More than a year ago I wrote a long chapter on the subject. It has been through the hands of many friends: fellow journalists, British and French politicians and a large number of army men.

In the same way my proposals in regard to the mobilisation of labor industry result not only from my own observations but also from those of many others. The scheme I suggest has met the approval of a number of Labor men here and abroad. It is, I believe, very near what the English would do, if they had to do it all over again.

Many of these subjects are highly controversial. There is room for wide and sincere difference of opinion. But I have found general agreement about them among those men, intimately familiar with the problems, who put the efficient conduct of war before every other consideration.

That is my point of departure. I am not considering the ethics of war, nor the advisability of our participation in the present struggle. I accept the fact that we have decided to fight and I try to show how the experiences of other democracies can teach us the way to do it efficiently.

ARTHUR BULLARD.

New York City,
26 March, 1917.

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UNIV. OF CALIFORNIA

MOBILISING

CHAPTER I

AMERICA GOES TO WAR

OUR Naval gunners are ordered to fire at German Submarines on sight. The Germans sink our ships without warning. Whatever the diplomats may like to call it, this is War.

And we do not know how to fight.

There is no possible gain and every chance of disaster in minimising the amount we have to learn. We have no American general who ever commanded an Army Corps, not one of our Naval Officers ever fought against a Dreadnaught, none of our Artillery men ever fired a real shot at an enemy aircraft.

Digging the Panama Canal has trained some of our soldiers in peace-time engi-

neering. It has given us men like Goethals, who know how to handle and feed large bodies of men. His assistants have had practice in honest buying and manufacturing, which will be of great value in organising our munition industries. For this we should be thankful. But when it comes to fighting — large-scale, modern warfare — we have no experience at all.

We must learn. And the speed with which we reach proficiency will depend very largely on how quick and ready we are to profit by the experiences of the European democracies under the same strain. For France and Britain are like us. They also had to learn.

The war is upon us and we all — individually in the privacy of our own hearts, collectively as a nation — must decide what we are going to do about it. Is " soldiering " going to mean limp laziness as it did in our slang of yesterday?

Or are we going to restore its true and more virile meaning?

We will do as little in this struggle with Germany — and do it as badly — as we did against Spain, if we are listless. We can do a great deal more — and infinitely more efficiently — if we set our hearts to it.

The possibilities we must face may be grouped under three heads — the two extremes and the more probable, far-from-happy, medium.

First. The submarine blockade of the British Isles may prove as ineffectual as the Zeppelin raids and the European Entente may be victorious in the field this summer. Few think they will win so quickly by force of arms alone. But they will be helped somewhat in their warfare by the economic distress of the Teutons. There are also signs and portents which may mean serious trouble between Germany and her Allies and this

too may hasten the victory of our friends. The Revolution in Russia may spread. Perhaps Turkey or Bulgaria, Hungary or Austria may collapse. And the Entente will also be helped by our financial, industrial and food reserves. Perhaps the war will be over by mid-summer.

If luck breaks for us in this way, it does not matter much what we do.

Second. At the other extreme, the Submarines may prove effective. As a matter of fact, we know very little about it. Both sides are optimistic. Not until several months have passed, not till we can observe results, will we have any certainty. We are not sure that the Germans have yet done their worst. There is a chance that in spite of any help we can bear, they may succeed in starving England.

It is impossible to picture all it would mean to us if Britain were forced to give in. But one thing is sure. We have already cast in our lot against the Cen-

tral Empires. We have crossed that Rubicon. We are not liked by the Germans, and if they starve England we will have to sign a treaty of abject surrender or fight to the extreme limit of our power. We could rally the wrecks of Britain, Canada, Australasia — perhaps South Africa. We might get some help from the Latin American Republics. If Japan kept up the fight we could hold the Pacific. But we would need every ounce of energy in our last citizen, if we were to show ourselves again across the Atlantic.

This is, I think, the least probable of the possibilities before us. But still it is there. War — as Sherman said — is not a pretty game.

Third. The middle and by far the most probable possibility is that the war will outlast this summer. The Submarines may prove as indecisive as the Zeppelins and the Spring Offensive of the Entente equally indecisive. Next September we may find the Map of the War

very little changed, the Germans driven back a few score miles in the west, their line somewhat advanced in Russia, the Balkans or in Italy — the deadlock still unbroken. If the next harvest in Germany and Austria comes up to the expectations of many impartial observers, and the Mittel Europa Alliance holds together, there is no reason to be sure that the European Entente will win in 1917.

France has already borne a tremendous strain. For two and a half years she has poured out her blood without stint; holding the enemy, as Horatius did of old, till help could be mustered. And she will go into this summer's campaign just as debonair, just as generous, just as unstinting as last year — which means that no matter how the tide of battle turns, a great many Frenchmen are going to die this summer. And if peace is not won by fall there will be need of more from us than money and munitions. There will be urgent need of men — our men.

And if we are to exercise the greatest possible pressure on the enemy in 1918, we must begin organising our forces at once. If we wait till the need is obvious, we will be late at roll-call.

Next Christmas, if the war is still in progress, there will be talk of peace, just as there was this winter. And the ministers of the Kaiser will base their terms on what they consider to be the actual strength of their enemies. They like to call themselves "realists" and they do their best to deserve that term. In 1914 they were not at all frightened by the thought that Britain might develop an Army. In the fall of 1917 they will not be much influenced by the fact that we have a population of a hundred million, or that we have passed a Universal Service Bill which will give us a great army five or ten years hence, when we have trained up officers for it. But if their spies tell them that we have drilled and equipped a large Army and have built the transports to carry them, they will be

impressed. It may even be the decisive consideration which will end the War.

So the question of whether or not this horror of bloodshed shall continue into 1918 may very well hinge on whether we get busy now or six months hence.

The best informed men in Europe are guessing on the duration of the war. Some are optimists and do not expect another winter in the trenches. But look up the betting at Lloyd's in London. They are used to assessing risks. And you will find that although the odds on the termination of the war in 1917 vary from day to day, they seldom reach even money. If we took such risks in business there would not be an insurance company in existence. Remember "the Spring Drive" of 1915, remember "the Big Push" of last summer, and how little they accomplished. Is it wise for us to bet everything on this year's offensive? If Germany is not defeated by the next

snow-fall, we will need an Army. Ought we to stake our honor on such a chance?

And — quite irrespective of the betting odds — is it good policy for us to sit idle in safety, taking profits but not risks, while our friends in Europe fight our battles? Is it wise policy, from the point of view of those of us who abhor militarism, to show a reluctance to fight now?

There are, I take it, three kinds of people. Conscientious objectors, who will not fight. Jingoes, who say they want to fight. And the rest of us, pacific people who do not like to fight.

We did our best to keep out of the conflict. Tolstoi himself could hardly accuse us of wanting to fight. About the worst he could say would be that perhaps if the Archangel Gabriel had been President, he might have arranged things. But none of the Archangels were candidates. The rest of us, who are not be-

lievers in passive resistance, feel that Mr. Wilson did all a mere man could to keep the peace. A strong and outspoken minority believe he did too much.

We have patiently — and abundantly — shown that it is hard to make us lose our temper. And now, unless we want to be trampled under foot, we must show that it does not pay to force us to fight.

We must raise an Expeditionary Army of a Half Million as quickly as possible — more quickly than has ever been done before.

We, who love peace, ought to keep out of war as long as possible and when we are forced to go in — go in hard!

And we will be running inexcusable risk, if we forget for a moment that we may *need* the men.

CHAPTER II

DEMOCRACIES AS FIGHTING MACHINES

THERE is no reason for us to be ashamed that we do not know how to fight. Free peoples never are prepared for war.

The last great struggle between democracies was our Civil War. And it was well on into the third year before either side really settled down to it. Lincoln's "expert" military advisers did not think it would last long, so they began by asking for ninety-day volunteers. Since then there have been no wars waged by democracies except the Anglo-Boer struggle and our conflict with Spain. In neither of these cases did popular government gain any military laurels. Overwhelming resources were used with wanton wastefulness. And so the tradi-

tion arose that democracies cannot fight.

Suddenly in 1914 the two great democracies of Europe were faced by what the Germans call Absolute War. There was no meeting the danger half-way. It was do or die. It was bring up every ounce of energy or go under.

France was much better prepared than Britain. But if we rank German preparedness at 100 per cent., France was little more than half ready. This seems to be an inevitable condition of those who would be free. Militarism is essentially oligarchic. The Liberals the world over are primarily interested in improving conditions at home. Where the people rule, the emphasis is put on internal affairs to the neglect of foreign relations.

So War, Absolute War, caught Britain and France by surprise. It was necessary to improvise a new national frame of mind. To be sure the older Frenchmen remembered 1870, and all the present generation had grown up under

the menace of a new invasion. But "Wolf! Wolf!" had been called so often. Public opinion was unprepared. The people had to forget their habitual hobbies, their personal interests and get together. In France they called the new spirit *l'Union sacrée.* The British, at first, were content with a "Party Truce."

There was no political machinery to meet the crisis. Statesmen, who had scarcely thought of danger, found themselves faced with the duties of a Committee of Public Safety. Deputies and Members of Parliament, who had been elected in times of peace because of their views on Old Age Pensions and Tariff Schedules, had to decide questions of war polity for which they had no training.

Our imagination has been caught by some of the more picturesque extemporisations of the soldiers. The Army behind Paris being hurled at Von Kluck's flank — in taxi-cabs. Auto-busses, fresh from the London streets — their theater

posters intact — rushing food up to the British front. But all the changing ministries, Coalition Governments, War Cabinets, etc., were at first no less clumsy extemporisations of political machinery. And even after two years and more, no satisfactory solution of the parliamentary problem has been found.

Preparedness, however, is only relative. Even the Germans, docile and disciplined, were not sufficiently prepared. They tried to be. They thought they were. But they were not — not quite. For to be really prepared it is necessary to understand your enemies, and Germany's programme was marred by one great miscalculation — Britain. They love to call themselves "realists," but they took account only of "actualities," paying no heed to potential power. The possibility of the British becoming efficient soldiers was beyond the range of their imagination.

The British contribution to this struggle may be judged from two points of

view. You may base your critique on what sober judgment in 1914 thought Britain could do. Or you may compare their accomplishments with what some of their misguided spokesmen have *said* they were doing or would do.

It is rather easy wit to work the "deadly parallel" between what Sir Edward Grey said Britain would do in defence of Servia and the unhappy fate of the Serbs. It is rather hard not to jibe when some over-enthusiastic Britisher talks about how "we saved Paris" or claims that the Battles of Ypres were "the greatest of history."

But of course the only sound point of view for estimating the British effort is to compare what they have done with what their friends and enemies expected them to do. It is imposing. The Germans thought the English Army was negligible, but to-day their land forces are as great a factor in the war as their Navy.

Free nations may be slow to start,

wasteful and inefficient by nature. They are normally pacific and never regard war as the chief end of man. But France and Britain have proved that democracies can conquer themselves, they can triumph over their weaknesses. No one can ever say again that democracies cannot fight.

There are endless lessons for us in the experiences of France and Britain. For nearly three years they have been struggling with the same problems we now have to face. They have had some stupendous successes, and have made some monumental blunders. In their adventures and misadventures we will find the signposts towards safety, and also the danger signals, on the road before us.

The first and most outstanding political lesson of this war is that in times of crisis, democracies will trust their gov-

ernments and will be lavish with money and men and effort in their defence. Imperial Germany, where "duty to the state" has been taught for a generation while liberty-loving nations were emphasising "the Rights of Man and Citizen," has not secured greater sacrifices from its people than Republican France and Liberal Britain.

The Lesson of Europe is explicit in this matter. And it should be of great comfort to Mr. Wilson and his advisers. No request from the democratic governments has been refused by the people.

There is only one qualification. The Call must be CLEAR.

This point was illustrated by the long-drawn-out and distressing controversy in England over conscription. Parliament never refused to vote any measure demanded by the Ministry, and the people never resisted any sacrifice called for by Parliament. The unrest was caused by lack of clarity. If Kitchener had calmly said that Universal Service was

necessary the nation would have consented at any time. But he made no such definite statement. Was it a serious demand of the General Staff or did the Tories consider agitation on the subject good tactics to drive the Liberals from power? Such mystification still exists. Very many people in England have told me that they are uncertain whether the final passage of the Conscription Bill was based on military necessity or party expediency, whether its advocates were attacking the Kaiser or Mr. Asquith.

It has been quite the same in France. No sacrifice which was clearly asked for has been refused. But the people have been deeply suspicious of partisan intrigue during the war. They say to the politicians: "Tell us clearly what you need to win. We, who are ready to forget our personal interests and give our lives in defence of our country, ask you to sacrifice your passion for getting or keeping your party in power."

This is the great heartening lesson for

us. The citizens of democratic countries stand ready for any sacrifice to defend their political faith. Our Administration can get from us anything it really needs. We are not more craven than the peoples of France and Britain. Let the need be made evident and we will meet it.

There are two errors into which France and Britain fell at first and from which they have only slowly recovered. It would be well for us to avoid them.

The first and most pernicious was "The Short War Fallacy." No one expected the struggle to last many months. Every one thought Kitchener was bluffing when he said, "Three years." And so at first every proposal which would take more than a few months to mature was rejected. Those who tried to be far-sighted were laughed down.

France, as much as Britain, was a victim of this Short War Fallacy. There

has of late been hot criticism of Joffre for not having built a railroad to Verdun. For although the motor trucks managed to save the city, the lack of better communications cost France thousands of lives. But it takes time to build a railroad and nobody thought the war would last as long.

Very early in 1915 it became evident that the volunteer system in England was missing many men who might well go and was taking in their stead irreplaceable workers from the mines and factories. It was obvious that a military and industrial census was desirable. But it was postponed and postponed because it would take time and no one thought there would be time enough. At last, when the need was pressing, the work was done by amateurs, hurriedly and inaccurately.

The French thought the war would be over so quickly that there would be no time to manufacture munitions, so they rushed too many men into uniform and

let the factory fires go out. For two years they were sending men back from the front to resuscitate their industries.

In a hundred and one ways — in their efforts to reorganise their political machinery to meet the crisis, in their fiscal arrangements, in their diplomacy, and even in their strategy — France and Britain were handicapped by this Short War Fallacy.

The second great constant source of trouble, noticeable all through the struggle to get France and Britain fully mobilised, has been the difficulty in finding a formula to differentiate temporary emergency proposals from permanent measures.

Everywhere individuals and parties have attempted to use the war as a pretext to fasten permanently on the nation measures in which they were interested. Prohibitionists in France and England have tried to utilise this crisis to put

through their reforms; but the liquor interests, fearing permanent interference with their profits, have successfully resisted. As an emergency measure — for the duration of the war — it might have been accepted.

In the financing of the war, the English have been more adroit in this regard than the French. They have enacted exceedingly heavy war taxes, under which many people in England are paying more than a quarter of their income. But there has been little opposition, for few people of wealth are so selfish as to fight against emergency taxes in times of crisis. The French *Chambre des Deputés*, however, was already discussing an income tax law before hostilities broke out. Its partisans tried to use the war as a pretext to force it through as a permanent fiscal reform. As a result all the peace-time opponents of the bill resisted fiercely and an unnecessary strain was put on the "*Union sacrée.*"

But on the other hand, in their efforts

to reorganise their political practice, the British have had more trouble than the French. The Members of Parliament at Westminster have not made it clear that their attempts to adapt the governmental machinery to this temporary emergency of war are not permanent assaults on democracy. The present government of France is more of a dictatorship than that of Britain. But one hears frightened cries of "Dictatorship" more often from English Liberals than from the French Republicans. In the last Cabinet Reorganisation in France the *Chambre* gave the Ministry power to make laws, without consulting them, by executive edict. And the French people have not only readily consented to this radical centralisation of power but have actively demanded it. Why? Because it is so obviously a temporary arrangement.

Everywhere — in finance, in political organisation and in industrial intensification — mobilisation has been greatly

facilitated by assurances that emergency war measures are only temporary.

There is for us one other general lesson in this spectacle of the mustering of Europe. Back of all the outward, material mobilisation there must be an inward, spiritual mobilisation.

In modern war, if there is anything like equality in population and resources, that nation, the greatest proportion of whose citizens feel that victory is more important than their private affairs, will win. The "Business as usual" frame of mind is the absolute anti-thesis of effective mobilisation. The *Res Publica* must come before individual gain. The more people, who realise that we are at war, who are disturbed by it, the more hearty will be the unanimity we will have in support of an energetic policy which will bring hostilities to a speedy end. Every citizen of the Republic who is indifferent to the war is dead weight. And

those who win profit from it are more dangerous than enemy soldiers.

Here again we have the example of Britain. As her interest grew, as more and more of her people *felt* the war, her power grew.

First, last and all the time, the effectiveness of our warfare will depend on the amount of ardor we throw into it. So the prime duty of our Government, the first step in any mobilisation, must be the awakening of our interest. There must be some loud, clear Call to Arms, which will electrify Public Opinion.

CHAPTER III

THE MOBILISATION OF PUBLIC OPINION

THE Tocsin must ring clear.

Mobilisation is an act, not an accident. It is not something which will happen to us, it is something we must do. And unless we hold the fact firm in our minds that war is something which concerns every one of us we will make a disgraceful muddle of it. Nobody knows how much of our strength we will need to put forth, but the first step must be an act of will. We must *want* to mobilise.

The Lesson of Europe is precise on this point — a democratic Government can stimulate this mobilising frame of mind. There are many agencies, many methods, which it can use to arouse the nation.

First of all, the Government must dispel all uncertainty by an honest statement of why we are forced to fight, of what sacrifices it expects of us and the goal for which we strive.

The British responded less quickly than the French, and the fact that France was actually invaded does not account for all the difference. In Britain the Call to Arms was not clear. Instead of being incited to extraordinary effort, the people were lulled into indifference. "Business as usual," was set before the Nation as a patriotic motto, and the people who accepted this advice and went about their usual business were not helping in mobilisation. It was only gradually, as this attitude was abandoned, that the force of Britain grew.

Their government never would have given the people this wrong lead if they had not been victims of The Short War Fallacy. No enlightened government will ever repeat that mistake. It is impossible to foretell how long hostilities

will last. "Business as usual" means delay in getting started. It must be the first duty of our Government to stir us into a realisation of what it means to fight.

An explicit statement of war aims is especially necessary for a nation of mixed population like ours. The Call of Race is not strong with us and, to those who hear it, its message is contradictory. We cannot expect our people of German blood to fight enthusiastically for Britain. We cannot expect our large Jewish population to be pro-Tsar. But all of us are pro-Liberal.

That must be the key-note of any war we are to wage effectively. The ideal of democratic liberty will rally more of us than any issue between one nation and another. The republican revolution in Russia and the struggle of the new government to get a start in the face of the armed menace of Prussian

Autocracy has already made a tremendous appeal to our people. If we are to fight worthily it must be for some object which we hold to passionately. All good wars have been Crusades.

If we are to abandon our isolation and go crusading in the cause of Democratic Righteousness abroad — and events have decided that matter for us — we have, in the President's Address to the Senate in regard to the organisation of the world for peace, an ideal platform.

Not only in its words but in its spirit and its occasion it expressed us as a nation. We were very reluctant to intervene in a purely European controversy. In the chaos of conflicting accusations it was hard for many of us to take sides as between the two groups of belligerents. We tried to hold to an aloof Neutrality, protecting only our own rights and the general principle of International Law. The thought of fight-

ing over a technicality was repugnant to us — although, God knows, we were affronted often enough by both sides.

But gradually the realisation grew that — willy nilly — we *were* in the war, that every action or inaction of ours influenced the fate of Europe. Each side appealed to us to enforce our just claims against the other. Should we continue to stay out? We were already in! Our official Neutrality was only a make-shift — giving us the opportunity to be deliberate. The question before us ceased to be: "Shall we go in?" and became "When and in what manner shall we admit that we are in?"

And side by side with this gradual change in our understanding of the situation, this slow forming realisation that any statement of aloofness was a pretence, there grew in our minds the conviction that it was a conflict not only between nations, not only between groups of statesmen, but a more fundamental, less easily definable clash between ideas.

Such struggles are always confused by side issues, and bleared by misstatements, but as the months passed the main issue began to clarify. European, American and Asiatic politics are now merged into world politics, and the world in which we live cannot exist half-slave, half-free. Napoleon said that within a century Europe would be either Republican or Cossack. The symbol of tyranny has changed in these hundred years. Democracy to-day does not fear the wild Cossacks of the steppes — they are fighting on our side — but the Prussian drill sergeant. It is the struggle which Napoleon foresaw. Whether the Tsar or the Sultan shall pray in Santa Sophia is of small concern to us. But we have no greater concern than to see to it that democracy does not perish from the earth.

The quarrel between Austria and Servia has become ancient history. The controversy over who first broke the law of the sea now seems academic. Whether this or that diplomatic move of for-

mer Ministers of Foreign Affairs was wise seems of small moment. Whatever the "causes" of the war, an issue has grown up out of the struggle itself. It is an issue on which we, as Americans, can take sides — an issue which we can not, without treason to our own ideals, avoid. It is the conflict between the forces of reaction and the impulse towards liberation.

With great adroitness, Mr. Wilson, in his request for peace-terms, his Address to the Senate, and at his Inauguration, has helped to clarify the issue.

Gradually — too gradually for some of us who were impatient — the President has led the nation to unanimity on this platform that not only national government, but the governance of the world, must rest on the consent of the governed. We draw the sword neither in resentment against violations of our rights, nor in defiance at insults, but to assert our solidarity with all those who would be free.

Mr. Wilson has not only unified our own public opinion by his discourses on the basis of peace. His words also have been heard abroad. They have been welcomed by the Liberals of Europe as a new and more inspiring statement of their faith. The freemen of Russia have responded. His statement of our national ideals has helped to clarify not only our own ideas but also those of our comrades in arms.

I have been told by people who call themselves "realists" that Perpetual Peace is irrealisable, that Mr. Wilson's ideal is a dream.

A dream? So was the Declaration of Independence. So was "*Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité.*" Nothing better to fight for has ever been invented than dreams.

The French raise their *levée en masse* to the cry "*La Patrie en dangeur.*" We have a broader, more inspiring war cry, "Democracy — the Hope of Humanity — is in danger!"

You may call such idealism "sentimental," if you will. But in this sense Democracy is sentimental. There is no clearer lesson from this European conflict. Some crafty Englishmen see the conquest of Mesopotamia and its vast potential wealth as the prize to struggle for. Some believe and argue and write that the Balance of Power in the Near East is the main issue. Some Frenchmen, like Maurice Barrès, want to annex the Rhine provinces of Germany; some are interested in the Protectorate over Syria. Some Russians saw in the war a reaffirmation of Autocracy. But such men do not volunteer. It was the Englishmen who believed in a duty to Belgium, who answered the Call. It is the Frenchmen who believe that the gifts of the Great Revolution are worth defending, whom you will find in the trenches. It is the Russians who look forward to liberty, who give their lives for their country.

Perhaps we will acquire larger influ-

ence in the world by delivering the *coup de grâce* to German ambitions. Perhaps it will enable us to negotiate profitable commercial treaties. Perhaps we will win glory and applause. But we will not mobilise efficiently for any such aims. If we are to fight well, it must be for an ideal — for a dream.

The Call to Arms must be definite and explicit — a ringing inspiration.

To further the mobilisation of Public Opinion, the Government must also give us a detailed plan of action. The will weakens in idleness. We must be given an answer to the question: "What can I do?" Some of us can do nothing but sit tight. Some of us can do no more than help the general cause by slight acts of self-denial. Some of us can do our bit in clerical work. The factories, the laboratories, the training camps will have place for some of us. There will be Red Cross bandages to roll, shirts to

be sewn, emergency constabulary work and recruiting posters to be drawn by artists. The list of various kinds of war work is interminable. And the more every individual citizen feels that he or she has work to do, the more vivid and firm and steadfast will grow the Will to Win.

We must also know what the Government is doing and planning to do. Timid advisers will urge secrecy, but the Government needs publicity. Nothing will do more to hearten us, to stimulate the mobilisation of Public Opinion, than knowledge of what is being done. And, if we are doing well, nothing will the more dishearten the enemy. We must be told which Munition Plants, which Government Bureaus, which Training Camps are doing the best, so that we can cheer them. We must be told which are laggard so we can jog them up. The fostering of a wholesome rivalry between the various States will keep things jumping. We ought to have a monthly

bulletin telling how each unit in the scheme is growing, for if we are to be kept interested we must know the plan so we can check up progress and follow the national effort intelligently.

One problem which we must face at once is "Censorship vs. Publicity."

Doubtless the Devil could contrive some worse impediment to the mobilisation of Public Opinion than a Censorship of the Press, but I doubt if he ever did. The blunders of the French and British censors have been so stupid that it is hard to escape the conviction that the idea itself is inherently stupid. Free discussion is the life-blood of democracy. Stop one and you stop the other. The people of France and Britain wanted a more efficient war than they were getting, but the Censors forbade criticism. If British newspaper men had not at last dared to risk imprisonment their Army

would still be short of shells. The Censorship in Russia made it impossible to drive traitors out of office except by bloodshed.

Military "experts" do not like civilian criticism. Generals are not used to reasoning with their subordinates, they do not argue about their orders, and so they do not like to explain to the nation. They bitterly resent criticism. But it does them good. They need not only our criticism but our help. Our General Staff is asking for authority to install an exceedingly drastic censorship. But even if they forget it, let us at least keep this lesson of the European war in mind: In France and Britain the Censorship systems devised by the military authorities did not work. Nominally intended to keep information from the enemy, they succeeded mainly in keeping news from the people at home. They proved themselves most efficacious in sheltering dishonest army furnishers and in hiding from the public the ineptitude of some

in high command. If the British Military Censor had had his way the failure of the Ordnance Officers to reorganise the Munition Industry would not have been discovered in time.

No organisation ever had a more passionate devotion to secrecy than the British Admiralty, but even the Sea Lords realised at last that they were overdoing it. People heard so little about the Navy that they were in danger of forgetting it. So Kipling and Alfred Noyes and others were called in to write up The Fleet. At first hostile to all publicity, the Admirals are now hiring Press Agents. Any branch of a democratic government is in a bad way, if the people lose interest in it.

At best the Censorship, in its effects at home, is purely negative — an effort to keep dangerous or misleading ideas from the Public. But even those who were strongest in their advocacy of protecting the sheep from pernicious or seditious ideas admit to-day that the Censor

has had only negative — and meagre — success. Bolder spirits have trusted democratic commonsense even in the heat of war and have tried the positive method of combating dangerous movements of opinion by Publicity, by constantly giving the man in the street something wholesome to think about.

The *modern* soldier realises that he needs civilian support and sympathy, for the old theory that military "experts" would suffice to win a war has fallen into disrepute. Lloyd-George organising the Munition work, reorganising the War Office, is broadly typical. The courses in chemistry in the military academies were not adequate for handling the problem of poison gas. Modern strategy is based on transportation, and one gets better railroading experience in Civil Life than in the Army. And even the Navy needs to use the brains of the Merchant Marine.

While there still are old fogies in uniform who cling to "the-public-be-

damned" theory and would rather lose a battle than accept help from a mere civilian, the type of officer who is being produced by this war, educated not in a school of theory but on the field, realises that victory in our day depends not only on armies but on civilians as well. War — the Absolute War which the Germans have unloosed — is national in the widest sense.

A modern Army lives on the support of the civilians. It is recruited from the people at home, supported by them, fed, clothed and above all munitioned by them. There is no more distinction between civilian and soldier than there is between the base and apex of a pyramid. The officer who has attended the school of this European war realises that he is lost if the people at home forget him.

And so, if the British and French General Staff were to draw up a censorship law to-day, it would be very different from the regulations they proposed in

the summer of 1914. It would be very different from the present project of the inexperienced officers of our War College. It would be designed exclusively to prevent the giving of treasonable information to the enemy.

With this limitation it would leave the door open wide for popular discussion of military problems. It would make it impossible for the great power of the Censor to fall into the hands of any clique of intriguing soldiers or politicians who might use it to further their private ambitions. It would welcome the freest criticism of grafters and incompetents, in or out of uniform, who impede the efficient conduct of the campaign. And it would go further. It would organise a publicity bureau, which would constantly keep before the public the work and the needs of the men at the front. It would requisition space on the front page of every newspaper; it would call for a "draft" of trained writers to feed "Army stories" to the public;

it would organise a Corps of Press Agents.

The experienced soldier, who subordinates everything to the efficiency of the Army, wants publicity for purely military reasons. But it is even more necessary for those who have the responsibility for the political life of the nation. In order to make a democracy fight wholeheartedly it is necessary to make them understand the situation. So in every country as soon as hostilities began, the Governments organised propaganda campaigns to make the struggle comprehensible and popular. The politicians unloosed their silver tongues. Poets and publicists were mobilised. And just as a skilled orator feels his way with a strange audience, trying one theme after another, dropping each one quickly if it does not stir response, and at last hits on the note which moves them, so the various Governments gradually settled down to a theme of war which brought results.

France had little need for such work. The fact of invasion was more eloquent than any oratory.

The Germans after some fumbling seem to have settled down to a semi-mystic hate propaganda —"God punish our enemies." In the struggle for existence between ideas this theme has proved for them the most fit to survive.

In Britain the official propaganda has been more varied and supple. The appeal which brought the first wave of volunteers was "Bleeding Belgium," the duty of the strong as good sportsmen to defend the weak. Then the attempt was made to stir national pride by posters quoting the Kaiser's alleged insulting reference to "the contemptible little English Army." An effort was made to frighten the people by the supposed danger of Invasion. Somewhat later, pictures were displayed of the famous treaty which had been called "a scrap of paper." Every note was sounded from rage against "the baby killers" to fidel-

ity to the pledged word as the basis of international relations. But by far the greatest response came on the appeal to democratic idealism — the issue between popular rule and military despotism.

We may be thankful that a great deal of this work of arousing us to a unified attitude towards the conflict was accomplished by Mr. Wilson before our diplomatic relations were broken with Germany. The democratic keynote of our war had been sounded before it began. It must be kept ever ringing in our ears.

Public Opinion cannot be sane and wholesome without freedom to discuss and argue, to criticise and oppose. The creation of a Censorship over political debate, in speech or printed word, is like putting a "nigger on the safety valve." It means a vast and appalling ultimate risk for a small immediate gain. The appearance of unanimity which the Tsar won by imprisoning the opposition, the semblance of content which is gained by

silencing discontent, the order which comes from tyranny, is fraudulent, unstable and dangerous. It is utterly undemocratic. And if this is not to be a democratic war in the widest and noblest sense it is not worth waging.

It is not enough that the objects of our war should be in accord with democratic idealism. This must be equally true of its methods.

Here again the lessons to be gained from France and Britain are illuminating. In both countries there have been attempts to discredit and overthrow democracy in internal politics. Everywhere the Reactionists have raised their heads, for the troubled waters of national crisis offered them encouragement and opportunity.

At the very beginning of the war the French Royalist faction came to life. An obscure prince of the House of Orleans had proclamations posted up on the walls of Paris in which he offered to

"save" France. The priests began to preach that Invasion was divine chastisement for the sin of disrespect towards Rome; and after the tide turned at the Marne, they brought Jeanne d'Arc out of heaven to account for "the Miracle." But the French statesmen were astute enough to recognise that no minority could win the war. So they quickly reassured the great Republican majority and the Reaction was shown to be ridiculously weak.

But in Britain the lines were not so sharply drawn. The Liberals were not strong enough — or did not think themselves strong enough — to bear the responsibilities of the struggle alone, and so Asquith invited Tories into a Coalition Cabinet. Inevitably the Liberal majority of Britain has been troubled, its enthusiasm for the war dampened, its loyalty strained, by the spectacle of notorious anti-democrats like Lord Lansdowne, Milner and Sir Edward Carson rising to power.

The Irish question, although excessively complicated and difficult for outsiders to understand, illustrates my point. No national unanimity is possible in Britain, not even a working majority, which does not include the Liberals, the Labour Party and the Irish. All three of these groups are pledged to Home Rule. The interest of the Irish Nationalists in the Bill is obvious. The Labourites and the Liberals are pledged to it from a profound conviction that it is a measure of democratic justice too long delayed. But in order to gain the support — and it was only lip service — of the small group of Die Hard Tories, Asquith gravely affronted and discouraged the big majority on which he should have based his policy.

To many British democrats, the Coalition Cabinet and more recently the Lloyd-George reorganisation, has seemed a triumph for the Reaction. For although there is good reason to believe that the British Empire — like the Rus-

sian — will emerge from this war more liberal than ever before, still the present trend towards Toryism is disquieting. *The Nation*, the leading Liberal weekly, published one discouraged editorial to the effect that the Germans had already won the war, as the Junker class was triumphant at home, Britain rapidly becoming Prussianised.

This is a lesson for us to bear in mind. Anything which tends to discourage the democratic element of our nation — any excessive profits for the Munition Makers, any return to power of the Old Guard — will distinctly lower the efficiency of our mobilisation.

Public Opinion, with us, finds its voice through Congress. And the frame of mind which befits us in this time of stress will need an exceptional political organisation to give it expression. Our partisan politics have been bad enough in peace times, and the closing scenes of the 64th Senate showed us only too

clearly the dangers of our present machinery. It does not work in a crisis.

The affairs of the Nation are too urgent at this moment to permit of a studied reorganisation of our parliamentary practice, and so it was unfortunate that in the first days of the Special Session of the new Senate they attempted to reach a final decision in the clôture rule. Two things were obvious in their debate. In the face of this unusual tension an overwhelming majority of the Senators wanted to put an end to undemocratic filibusters. But also a large number were profoundly distrustful of any permanent limitation of their right to full and free discussion. After much palaver they arrived at a not very satisfactory compromise. No one was sufficiently adroit to propose a *temporary* rule to meet the emergency.

Public Opinion is disturbed over the prospect of the New Congress. The House of Representatives is so evenly divided in its party loyalties that no one

can foresee what it will do. It may fight for three months over organisation, for the "patronage" of a whole session is at stake, and the choice of a Speaker now will undoubtedly influence the next Congressional elections. So the danger of a bitter and paralysing partisan struggle in the work of organising the House, or at some later moment in the life of this Congress, is obvious to us all. Yet no one doubts that a large majority of the Congressmen could be brought together in a provisional organisation, which would not threaten their perennial prerogatives and perquisites.

What we need is a National Emergency Party.

Many patriots have raised their voices in behalf of a Party Truce, a bi-partisan organization based on a division of spoils. But the experiments in Coalition Government tried in France and Britain did not work well. First of all it meant a divided responsibility, allowing each

party to claim credit for joint successes, while blaming the other party for every failure. But the principal trouble arose over the inevitable intrusion of permanent issues into the temporary machinery.

If we hope to avoid their blunders we must make a sharp distinction in such matters. Much of the regular life of the community will go on in spite of war. The schools will stay open. The controversy between osteopaths and the orthodox priesthood of medicine will continue. The Inter-State Commerce Commission will still have to fix freight rates on knitting needles and pencil sharpeners. Harbors will have to be dredged, post-offices built, inspectors appointed. These matters have nothing to do with the present crisis, and they would unnecessarily clog and strain any provisional machinery.

If a National Emergency Party were formed, pledges of co-operation could be secured from a large majority of Con-

gress. They should then prepare a special Slate — Temporary Speaker and Chairmen for the Standing Committees of Foreign Affairs, Army, Navy and Finance. They should choose these men irrespective of party or seniority, solely on the basis of their ability and good repute. They should complete their organisation like the old parties, appointing whips and arranging for caucuses.

In each House, the Temporary Speaker and the chairmen of these four committees would form the Emergency Committee. On their motion Congress would resolve itself into an Emergency Session. The Members pledged to the National Party would then form the majority necessary to consider and act on Bills presented to meet the military situation.

As soon as the first batch of urgent war measures was disposed of, the National Majority would dissolve on the old familiar partisan lines, and Congress could proceed to its regular organisation

and the routine of ordinary business until the need arose to revive the Provisional organisation. No question should be put by the Temporary Speaker which did not affect the crisis. The Permanent Organisation should deal with all routine business.

There is no use now in regretting that we do not have a responsible ministry like the French, nor the chance of a new general election like the British. We have chosen the President and Congress for a term of years. It is bad enough to have them wrangle in the piping times of peace. They will very quickly throw Public Opinion into disarray and render efficient mobilisation impossible, if they do not at once work out an organisation which will run smoothly. And the more clearly the distinction is made between the permanent and the temporary, the easier it will be to find a solution.

If the Administration is to rally to it a united nation it is equally necessary to have a reorganisation of the Execu-

tive Branch of the Government. The best thing about our present system of Cabinets is that they are united by the allegiance of all their members to one political party, but the price we pay for this spirit of accord in the Cabinet is that the best brains in the other party are not utilised. We do not want the Executive Council thrown into disunion by partisan disputes and rivalries. The members must owe loyalty directly to their Chief, not to party machines. But in times of National Crisis the Cabinet should be as strong as possible.

The President could increase his hold on Public Opinion if he dispensed with his less able Secretaries and replaced them by Republicans of more renowned ability. And he could find in the ranks of the opposition men of the required ability, who were also sufficiently patriotic to forget their party allegiance when they entered the Cabinet. They should be called to his council not as representatives of the Republican Organisation but

as eminent Americans. It is not a coalition between two hostile parties which we need, but a coalescence of the nation.

The President should choose his War Cabinet not only on the individual merits of the candidates, but with an eye to the confidence they will inspire in the nation. Take Mr. Daniels as one example. His fitness as Chief of the Navy is seriously questioned. Much of the criticism is so bitter that it is obviously unjust. But what the people think of him is as important as what he has done. And, although it is quite possible that the attacks on him have been unfounded, public confidence in him has been undermined. A king, convinced of the ability of one of his ministers, could afford to maintain him in office in defiance of popular sentiment. A president cannot. A man like Hoover might do no better as Secretary of the Navy than Daniels, but the change would fortify Public Opinion. This must be the criterion which guides any democratic statesman in such cir-

cumstances. Personal or partisan loyalties are out of place. We want the President surrounded by men we know and trust. We would be comforted to see Goethals as Secretary of War, not that we have anything against Baker, but because we know Goethals better.

However, no such broadening of the Cabinet is possible until a dependable majority in Congress is assured. The Administration, at present, has only one reliance in putting through its legislative programme — the regular party Machine. Whether we like it or not, it is the only means at the disposal of the President. And he cannot risk weakening the Organisation of his Party, by dropping "favorite sons" from his Cabinet, until a sound, non-partisan National majority is assured in Congress.

This, in outline, is the political problem which we must solve. In the face of an unparalleled national crisis we are threatened by a paralysing deadlock between the Executive and the Legislative

Branches. We can not take time to work out permanent constitutional reforms. We have need of a temporary, extra-legal expedient to meet the emergency. For we cannot expect unity in Public Opinion if the Government is divided.

The mobilisation of governmental machinery on a War basis once attended to, we can go on with the work of unifying the National Mind. In this the French had two great advantages which came from the extreme centralisation of their administrative system. Differences in our national organisation make it impossible to borrow these French methods directly, but their example is suggestive of things we must do.

The school mistresses have played a notable part in developing the superb unanimity of the French people. Most of the men in the school system have been called to the colors, but the school-marm stays at her post. And in the remote

villages of France, where the great metropolitan newspapers do not penetrate, the school-house is always the intellectual centre of the community.

The Premier addresses the *Chambre des Deuptés* on some matter of national importance. The Minister of Public Instruction makes a résumé of it, with ample explanatory notes, and sends it out as a "general order" to his subordinates. A few days later every school mistress in France reads it to her pupils. In the evening the principal men of the village talk it over with her and they all go home that night — the peasants from Brittany to Mentone — thinking of the same problem from the same point of view.

Monsieur Ribot, the white-haired wizard of finance, decides to issue a new loan. He wants all the thrifty, good people of France to empty their stockings, their little hoards of gold, into the treasury of *La Patrie*. He calls on his colleague of Public Instruction and be-

tween them they compose an explanatory "general order" to the school teachers of France. So when the placards are put up, advertising the new loan, there is always at least one person in even the tiniest village who can explain each clause of the law.

It is a steady, quiet, unobtrusive influence — but vastly significant. When the history of the war is written the school mistresses of France will deserve great credit. They have done "their bit" by explaining to the people the events of the war, stimulating their patriotism, unifying their thinking and keeping them from discouragement when the news is bad.

The National Ownership of the Telegraph has also given the French Government a tool which they have been quick to use. Twice a day the General Staff issues a statement on the military situation. The midnight bulletin is not so important as the afternoon "*communiqué de trois heures.*" There is something

hypnotic in its monotonous regularity. Every day, for more than two years, everybody in France, man, woman and child, has grown tense together, waiting for the three o'clock bulletin. It is stupendous — the whole nation thinking together once every day.

All morning long people attend to and think of their personal affairs. But after lunch *La France* — the nation — begins to come into being. You can see the tension grow. By two o'clock every one is thinking up plausible excuses to be out on the street in front of the post office when the *communiqué* is received.

It is not good form now in France to show emotion. Republican stoicism is in order. And so at this fateful hour the people appear indifferent. But each mind is questioning: "Will the news to-day be good or bad?" All are making the daily resolve to meet the news as brave citizens — not to lose their heads in extravagant optimism over successes,

not to show distress if the bulletin is "*grave.*"

I was travelling in France last spring when the Crown Prince was pounding at Verdun, and I have never seen anything more inspiring than the way the people of the South, of Lyons, of Paris, took the daily *communiqué de trois heures.* It was terrible at first when the news was regularly bad. But France was marvellous under the blows. Never was any nation more united in the face of the enemy. The regular rhythm of thinking together once a day, in fair days and foul, has had a stupendous, an incalculable effect.

So we must do over here. By every means at its disposal our Government must strive to get us thinking together. For unless that is accomplished, there is nothing but endless muddle before us, a welter of blunders, inefficiency and disgrace. We — the people of the United States — are the force back of the Government. Unless our Will to Win

is passionate and determined, our Army and Navy will accomplish little.

Forain, the great cartoonist, drew a picture early in 1915 which has been worth a couple of Army Corps to France.

It represented two *poilus* in the rain and mud of that first winter in the trenches. They are discussing the prospects of the war.

"We'll win," one of them says, "provided they stand firm."

"They?" his comrade asks. "Who do you mean?"

"The civilians."

CHAPTER IV

THE MOBILISATION OF INDUSTRY

IT is in money and munitions that we can most promptly help our comrades already in arms. And the amount of aid we can give them is limited only by the strength of our national desire. If we are in earnest about it we can do a great deal.

One thing is certain. However long the war lasts, whether our Army is to be large or small, the Government will have to do a great deal of buying. And even if our only contribution to our friends in Europe should be food, we ought to have a Government Purchasing Bureau to protect them from speculators here. We have much to learn from Europe in military matters, but in meeting such problems as this we are prepared.

Goethals of Panama or Hoover of Belgium at the head of the Purchasing Bureau would at once remove all suspicion of slackness, inefficiency or graft. Such men are a national asset of which we must make use. Names like theirs are symbols of the kind of decent, energetic, efficient action which would make the war popular. And we have more reason to fear graft than German spies. It will take only a very little "embalmed beef" to take all the snap out of us.

The methods by which we can most effectively put our immense financial reserves at work for the defeat of Germany must be planned by experts.

Our laws are notoriously backward in governmental control of finance. But the savings of the people are as much a part of our national resources as our man-power. We can no more permit a banker to use the money which we have

intrusted to him in unpatriotic speculations, than we could allow a general to lend one of our regiments to the enemy. The vast sum of our savings in banks, insurance and trust companies is a force which should be immediately available as a national weapon.

Once more, this is no time to argue out far-reaching, permanent reforms in our fiscal system. We need an emergency measure, which — for the duration of the emergency — will put our financial reserves at the disposal of the Government. We do not want acrimonious discussions of the best way to raise the budget in normal times. We do not want befogging debates on the relative soundness of Bond Issues and Direct Taxation. We want quick results. Europe has been a laboratory of experiment in War Finance, and our Treasury experts ought to know which method has proved the best. Most of us have small knowledge of finance, but loans — Bond Issues — seem to mean a larger profit to the mid-

dleman banker, which is of course an argument against that method. Still if the lessons of the European War have convinced our government experts that Bond Issues are the quickest and most effective means of mobilising finance, few of us will feel inclined to argue. The results, more than the methods, are of importance in an emergency.

The one thing for us, who are laymen, to insist upon is that our bankers shall no longer coin excessive profits out of the needs of our friends.

When we leave the icy heights of finance and come down to "the business proposition" of intensifying the output of munitions, we face a problem more comprehensible to most of us. It was however the gravest and most troublesome problem with which the democracies of Europe had to deal.

In 1914 no one knew what was the best ratio between munition makers and sol-

diers. No one could foresee what was going to be needed. Few knew where the raw material came from. Worst of all no one was sure how long the war would last. Every one under-estimated its duration. So neither France nor Britain had a coherent plan of munition production to start with. Inevitably everything at first was chaotic, makeshift, inefficient.

Britain went through three stages in the effort to intensify output — first, an appeal to private initiative; second, reluctant State Aid; and third, a thoroughgoing Government control. In the last stage the increase in production has been phenomenal.

The munitions which we have furnished to the Entente so far have come solely from private initiative. We have barely scratched the surface of our resources. If the Government sets its shoulder to the wheel the increase of output will be immense. We have had more than two years to watch our sister democracies of

Europe struggle with this problem — and solve it. We have had ample time — and it is to be hoped, also the intelligence — to profit by their experience.

There are in particular two dangers to be avoided.

I. In the first days of the war there was a natural and comprehensible tendency to put every energy into the Army and to let industry take care of itself. France blundered into this error more deeply and suffered more from it than Britain. At the call to arms she put too many men into uniform and let her factories close down. The immediate invasion of her coal and iron districts in the North was a great blow, but her munition industry was even more hampered by lack of men. In spite of the patriotic response of the women of France, who not only brought in the harvests to feed the nation but also in great numbers entered the factories, the Army was soon

short of munitions. It was only slowly and with hesitancy that the Government recovered from the Short War Fallacy and began sending men back from the front to work the machines of industry.

Britain — from the same reason — made the same blunder. It was lightly assumed that the best way to serve your country was to die for it. No serious discrimination was made in the early recruiting. Thousands and thousands of men who were very much more valuable in the mines, the iron mills and in agriculture went into the training camps.

II. The opposite error, "Business as usual"— also a result of the Short War Fallacy — was an even more serious check to speedy and complete mobilisation of industry. And into this mistake Britain stumbled more deeply than France.

The old Manchester School of Political Economy — the *laissez-faire*, trust-to-luck philosophy — still dominated the thinking of the English Liberals. The

Government wanted to interfere with the processes of industry as little as possible. Production, they held, is based on the lure of profits. They were entirely unprepared to realise that people will work harder out of patriotism than they will for an increase of income.

So at first Britain tried to meet an extraordinary emergency by ordinary means. "Private initiative" was tried and miserably fell down on the job. The Government then took hesitating steps in the direction of State Aid: grants of capital, subsidies, bonuses. But these measures — in the immoderate need — brought only moderate returns. And so, as they could not get results by appeal to the commercial instinct, they were forced at last to go the limit in direct government control and operation of the war industries.

In France the difficulty on this score arose principally over the lack of a clear definition of "munitions." Every one was ready to admit that shells are ammu-

nition and that their manufacture should at once be directed and controlled by the Government. But is red wine, which *les poilus* call "*pintard*," a munition? And how about the silk used for balloon envelopes? "Munitions" are as hard to define as "contraband." Of course the only workable definition is: all things needed by the Government for the conduct of the war. It is not the nature of the product which is important, but who needs it.

The French suffered considerably from lack of such a definition. It was in these subsidiary industries that the *profiteurs* piled up excessive fortunes and that the worst labor conflicts occurred.

The greatest element in mobilising industry is Labor. Nothing much can be done without the hearty co-operation of the wage-workers and of their organisations. Here again the struggles of the European democracies with this problem

which now faces us is full of lessons — lessons both of encouragement and of warning.

Imperial Germany has not — presumably has not dared to — put as much strain on her laborers as France and Britain. At the first sign of food shortage, the Kaiser's government put the nation on rations which bore more heavily on the well-to-do than on the poor. The system of bread and meat tickets has not greatly reduced the diet of the wage-earners. The German statesmen have nursed the proletariat. Even Prussia has promised them some measure of democratic power after the war. An intelligent and largely successful effort has been made not to give the workers any specific grievances.

The democratic governments were not so foresighted. They were slow to establish measures to safeguard the interests of Labor. It was only under the pressure of circumstances that they gave attention to this problem.

Both in France and Britain the organised workers responded immediately and wholeheartedly to the Call to Arms. Many were surprised at this. In France the extreme revolutionary syndicalism of the General Confederation of Labor had been intensely anti-militarist and to a large extent anarchistic and anti-patriot. But behind the fog of diplomatic correspondence and the veil of theory, the workers of France and Britain saw a clear-cut issue between democracy and military despotism. They believed that the principles of popular self-government were worth defending and they rallied to the Call with a patriotism not surpassed by any class of society.

The English Unions gave more than their proportion to the first wave of volunteers. On their own initiative they abandoned all their strike plans. This was a very real sacrifice for them. The cost of living had been going up in England in the last decade and there had been no compensating raise in wages, so

practically all the large unions were preparing for simultaneous strikes in the fall of 1914. They had been at work for years mobilising for a bitter fight. The German Government, through their spies, knew of this. They were counting on Industrial War in England. But in the face of national danger the British workers gave up their own plans and threw themselves into the work of National Defence.

Of almost equal importance to this sacrifice of their wage demands, was the action of the British Unions in regard to fraudulent Army Furnishers. They served notice that they would strike in any shop which tried to cheat on government contracts. And the fact that the British Army has suffered less than ever before in its history from paper-soled shoes, shoddy clothing, and wooden bullets is very largely due to the patriotism of Organised Labor.

But this first spontaneous outburst of patriotism — this immensely valuable

asset — was soon dampened. To a less extent in France, to a much greater extent in England, the enthusiasm of the working class was cooled by official stupidity — sometimes stupidity of act, but more often of inaction.

The development of the situation in the coal fields of South Wales is broadly typical. There had been a good deal of anti-militarist agitation among the men. In the week before hostilities broke out, they had voted to strike in case of war. They expected a like action from the coal miners of Germany. Modern war they argued would be impossible without coal, so if all the miners of the world acted together the great tragedy could be prevented. But Organised Labor in Germany did not respond. (There also the workers were more loyal to their government than to their class.) And the first news of the invasion of Belgium put an end to all anti-military propaganda in Wales. The miners proved themselves more patriotic than the rest of England

— furnishing considerably more volunteers than their due proportion.

Once war began there was no thought of a strike in the coal fields. The men who had not volunteered were working overtime to make up for those who had gone and to increase the gross output. But all this the Government accepted from them as a matter of course. It took no care to protect them from less patriotic people who were taking advantage of their sacrifices.

Very soon discontent — inevitable, justifiable discontent — arose. For the coal-owners were not exhibiting any self-denying patriotism. They were charging top prices — all the traffic would bear — to the Navy, the Merchant Fleet and the Munition Factories. They were also holding up the Allies. The profits of the coal owners and their close allies, the shipping interests, soared. And the Government, committed to the Business-as-usual theory, did nothing to stop this abuse till the complaints from France and

Italy, where people were freezing and where the manufacture of munitions was being throttled, became too strident to be ignored.

The miners knew that their extra efforts were benefitting the Cause of Democracy very little, but were swelling the fortunes of their bosses extravagantly. And the Government did nothing to protect them from the piracy of the food speculators. While their wages, inadequate before the war, had not been increased, the price of their food had gone up forty per cent.

But the worst of it was that when the public outcry for cheaper coal and a greater output became insistent, the Coal Barons replied that they could do nothing unless the Unions were smashed. They proposed some laws, compulsory arbitration, forced labor, etc., which seemed to the workers cold-blooded assaults on their liberties.

And then the first strike broke out.

The Government, in the person of Mr. Lloyd George, came down to Wales to mediate. His intervention gives us a very human picture of a perplexed statesman, immensely preoccupied with other and to him more important problems, obsessed by the Short War Fallacy — a fallacy shared by his colleagues in office, shared by almost every one. His dominant idea was to postpone all lesser issues in the face of the great national crisis. As he has dealt with the Irish Question, so he dealt with the Welsh miners.

We do not know what he said to the bosses — that was a private conference. But he spoke to the men in a public meeting. He had no coherent remedy for their complaints. He had not had time to think the problem out. He did not believe there was time to solve it. The midst of a Great War was not an ideal occasion for an attempt to settle the age-old dispute between the " haves " and the

"have-nots." His one object was to get the men back to work and postpone the settlement.

Lloyd George is a past master of popular oratory. And all his repertoire is in that speech — half-sobbing emotional pathos, cajolery and good jokes, promises and threats. But the keynote of it all was an appeal to their loyalty. "Don't go back on the boys at the front."

The men, unconvinced by his promises but moved by his appeal, went back to their underground jobs. And we may imagine Mr. Lloyd George heaving a great sigh of relief, taking the midnight train back to the Parliament at Westminster, brushing aside those who wanted to waste time congratulating him over his success in Wales, and throwing his tireless energy into the soul-consuming work of infusing activity into the nation.

And we cannot be very much surprised that, in the rush of other work, he forgot his promises to the Welsh Miners — till

they reminded him of their intolerable conditions by new strikes.

With slight differences of detail this is the story of every industrial dispute which has arisen in France or England to impede the conduct of the War. Everywhere Organised Labor was patriotic — *wanted* to be patriotic — and came more than half-way to meet the Government in the defence of democratic institutions. It cheerfully assumed more than its due share of the common burden. But where Labor was rebuffed, it grew sullen. If the workers were not protected from less patriotic exploiters, they tried to protect themselves by the only weapon they knew.

The Organised Working-men are peculiarly sensitive to Public Opinion. They have not the type of mind of those filibustering Senators who stood out alone against the manifest will of their associates. If the Unions are convinced that their interests are being protected, that the war is not being conducted against

them, they will at once discountenance any unjustified strike in a time of crisis.

This was illustrated when a group of mechanics on the Panama Canal job tried to hold up the Commission for wages far in excess of those gained by their mates at home. They had no reason for striking, except that they thought they had the Government in a hole. But their own National Organisation at home at once denounced them and offered to replace them if they quit work.

The coal strikes in Wales would not have been possible if an overwhelming proportion of the Trade Unionists in other industries had not considered them justified. If the Government had had a strong case against the Welsh miners, the other working-men would not have countenanced the strike. But by failing to protect labor from unpatriotic exploitation the Government had weakened its case hopelessly.

The wage earning class is the largest and most devotedly liberal element in

any modern nation. No democratic war is possible without their wholehearted support. And the question of assuring their cordial co-operation — obviously a matter of vital importance — will not solve itself. It demands immediate attention. It cannot be evaded. It must be faced.

The problem will be the same in America. The men will be patriotic, for they hate the autocratic principle. They will support our government against autocrats abroad, in so far as they are convinced that it is not controlled by our home-grown autocrats.

But every one who reads our newspapers knows that many big employers of labor openly advocate universal military service as a good means of smashing the Unions. Some have written in the public press favoring a war with Germany — a war with any one — on the theory of Napoleon, the Less, that: "Foreign adventures distract attention from discontent at home." And just as

the French Republicans knew that the Royalists and Clericalists would grasp at war as a pretext to regain power, so our working-men know that anti-labor forces will try to use this crisis to attack them.

This is not a question of whether one approves or disapproves of the Organisation of Labor. It is a lesson of cold fact. A democracy cannot carry on an effective war without the sincere cooperation of the working class. And the Unions will not support a war which is directed against themselves. They cannot be expected to consider that patient submission to overwork and underpay for the greater glory and profit of the bosses is a patriotic duty.

Imperial Germany was astute enough to foresee the danger of any justified discontent among its workers. France saw it quickly. Britain, less quickly. But in the end, after many bitter and anxious moments, Britain had to face and solve the problem. Are we adroit enough to

profit by these lessons or must we learn them for ourselves by months of muddle, painful paralysing strikes and industrial war?

One point to which I have frequently referred and which deserves emphasis in this connection is the advisability of making it clear that War Measures are temporary.

Throughout the first two years of war, when Britain was evolving a solution to the munition problem, the issue was continually befogged by the ingrained British reverence for precedents — respect for those already established and fear of establishing unsound rules for the future.

It was only slowly that the nation came to realise that the crisis was unprecedented, that methods were demanded which had no relation to the needs of normal times. The process of intensifying munition production would have been immensely speeded up, if British states-

manship had produced a formula of emergency. A clear statement that war measures were temporary, and not to be used as precedents for the future, would have greatly eased the situation.

One thing which seems a strange paradox is that the same Coal Barons who fought doggedly against any concessions to their men, submitted without a quiver to direct war taxes — taxes on profits, taxes on income — of unprecedented rigor. Some of them are paying a quarter in the dollar in income tax and the other taxes besides. They submitted to these drastic taxes for the very reason that being so drastic, they could not be permanent.

But in facing the industrial problem, Lloyd George never found the happy formula to free his proposed concessions from the suspicion of permanency.

There had been so much talk of Government Ownership of the coal mines in the pre-war days that the owners were on their guard. They preferred to have the

tax-gatherer take a quarter of their cash to having any suspicion cast on the validity of their title to the source of their wealth. Even if Government operation be the wiser permanent policy, it is obviously tactless to raise the question unnecessarily at a moment when you want the wholehearted co-operation of the actual owner.

The same psychological snag was repeatedly run against when dealing with Labor. Men who had been earning eight shillings a day gladly volunteered at a shilling a day — for the duration of the war. The same men at home fought stubbornly against reduction to seven shillings and six. They were ready to accept any temporary sacrifice demanded by the emergency, but they resisted bitterly any lowering of their Union standards, any concession at all, which seemed a permanent surrender.

So, whenever our Government appeals to either Capital or Labor for sacrifices in behalf of the war, it is of pri-

mary importance to make it clear that the concession asked for is a temporary emergency measure.

The experience of France and Britain indicate a solution of this nature:

The War Government should clearly state that it is not trying to solve the Industrial Problem, that the measures it proposes are temporary and will not outlive the emergency, that its one object in interfering with industry is the intensification of production.

The Munitions Commission should apportion its orders to existing plants (or arrange for their erection if necessary). Any company accepting government contracts should open its books. The Commission should fix a price based on actual costs of production and a moderate profit — eight per cent. or whatever proves necessary to attract private capital. And a schedule of increasing production up to utmost capacity should be agreed upon.

The contracts should read that the Government will not intervene so long as the output is maintained in quality and quantity as per specifications — but that it will at once assume control of the factory, for the duration of the war, if production falls below the schedule agreed upon.

It would then be up to the Employer and the Employés to arrange their own difficulties as they saw fit, so long as their dispute did not slacken the output.

If the boss felt that his men were making excessive demands and that his profits were too low, he could quit the job and turn his factory over to the Government.

If the men felt that the boss was making excessive profits, overworking or underpaying them, they could strike and automatically become Government employés.

There should be a clear understanding on all sides of exactly what would hap-

pen if a cessation of work forced the Government to assume control. It should mean to the owners a rental of six per cent. on the physical value of their property, to the men employment under the Union conditions in vogue in the Government Arsenals.

The Munition Commission should call together representatives of Capital and Labor and say to them:

"Citizens, we are at war. And in these modern days it is the volume of munitions that wins. Our ability at organising industrial ventures is one of our great national prides. For the moment it is by industrial co-operation that we can most help our Comrades who are already in arms.

"We do not intend to use this emergency of war as a pretext to put through any collectivist legislation and we are not going to use this crisis as an excuse for smashing organised labor. We are not attempting to solve the permanent problems which face you. In your dis-

putes, we will be — for the duration of the war — strictly neutral.

"The National Emergency is too urgent to permit of consideration of the Industrial Problem in the abstract. We are faced by a concrete task — the increase of output. We are not interested in anything else.

"To you, whose capital is at stake, we promise not to adopt any confiscatory policy. We want you to operate and direct your factories. We intend to pay you for the use of your property and for your administrative work. We will give you a price estimated on a decent profit. As long as you continue to operate your plant and intensify your production we will not limit your earnings. If you can improve your methods and increase your dividends, we will not object. If you can increase your profits by finding labor below the market price — well, that does not sound wise to us — but we will not intervene on that score. If you can afford to pay your employés

more than Union rates, so much the better. But we are not directly interested in profits or wages. Our concern is only with output. To fall below the standard is industrial treason.

"To you, who contribute to industry your strength and manual skill, we promise adequate protection. We can not possibly win this war without your enthusiastic patriotism. We know you are in hearty accord with ideals for which we are fighting. But, while we expect your support, we are also resolved to deserve it. We may have to ask you to waive some of your Union rules. But such sacrifices as are demanded of you we stamp with our guaranty, 'Temporary.' They are emergency — house-afire — measures. We pledge ourselves to allow no one to take selfish advantage of such sacrifices.

"We cannot at this time plan an ideal wage, nor ideal shop conditions. We must take the best we can find ready at hand. We will maintain the labor

conditions as worked out in Government Shops, of which your Unions have approved, as a minimum standard. If we are unable to prevent an increase in the cost of living, the Government wage will be raised in compensation. You are familiar with the standards in our government factories. You are to consider that you have a right to similar conditions.

"However, it is not our intention to limit you to this minimum. Many employers in private factories are able to give better terms. We have no objection to your drawing a hundred dollars a minute if you can find any one to pay it. Whether your wage is raised or lowered is not our concern. Do anything you want to better your condition which does not check production. The books are open on Government jobs, you can see for yourself how far you can go. But all you can gain by striking is Government operation and Government wages — *and no more!*

"Citizens, we have tried to be fair to both sides. We undertake to protect each of you from unpatriotic or unjust demands of the other. We are subordinating everything to the needs of this emergency. We would much prefer not to assume the burden of operating the munition industry and we hope you can do it for us. If you fail us, we will be forced to take over your factories for the duration of the war. That will mean six per cent. for Capital and fair wages for Labor.

"Now we appeal to you as patriots. The time has not come when you are needed at the front to defend those ideals which are our common heritage and treasure. Your country needs, not your blood, but your skill.

"We have done the best we can for you. Now — go to it! Deliver the goods!"

Capital, although in Europe it has been very reluctant to forego excessive

profits, could hardly object to such a patriotic appeal.

And no one who knows Organised Labor here, or has watched it in this war emergency in Europe, can doubt that it would respond wholeheartedly.

It would not be necessary to conscript Labor. The Government has been a "good employer." In times of peace the men have learned that. Very few of them would want to strike on a government job in a time of crisis. Any who did would be overwhelmed by the denunciations of their mates.

Give them this for a slogan — "A fair wage and a fair profit" — and they will boost our industrial production to the sky.

It is not their patriotism which is in question, but their faith in our good faith. Reassure them, convince them that their sacrifices are appreciated, and the trouble with the labor market will not be strikes, but the tendency of the

men to sneak away from the factories to enlist.

I chanced to visit one munition plant in England. It had been organised on capital, most of which had been raised by a free loan from the Government. The contract with the Munition Department had been arranged on an estimated weekly output of 3,000 shells and the price had been based on this figure.

The shops were placarded with posters urging the workers to "do their bit," "to help the boys at the front." And by such ardent appeals to the patriotism of the employés the output had been nearly doubled. But no increase in pay had been granted the workers and no reduction had been made in the price of sale to the Government.

The employés in this shop, many of whom were women, worked at tremendous speed for exceedingly long hours. They did it "to help the boys at the front" but they soon realised — and were sore and bitter with the knowledge — that

most of their patriotic effort was being absorbed by the shockingly big profits of the shareholders.

I presume that this case was exceptionally flagrant. I visited these shops before the Government became rigorous in its effort to stop such scandals. But there were enough similar cases to seriously dampen the first patriotic ardor of the British wage-earners. No government deserves the support of Labor under such circumstances.

The country which can say to its workers, "This is a war of fair wages and fair profits" is the kind of a country the workers will fight for.

CHAPTER V

THE MOBILISATION OF MEN

IF events should force us to fight to the limit of our strength, we could muster an army of more than ten million men. Of course we could not do so at once and it is hard to imagine circumstances which would demand so great an effort. But experience has shown that one-tenth of the total population is the standard of complete mobilisation.

Canada went into the War under conditions not dissimilar to ours. They were not invaded, they were unprepared, and they had like us a large number of non-assimilated immigrants. And we have to our advantage the lessons of their experience and a big start in the munition business. Yet in two and a half years they have reached near to half of

complete mobilisation. Approximately one-twentieth of their population is in uniform, at the front or in the training camps.

So, if we do as well as our next-door neighbor, we ought to muster in the same period five million men and have at least half of them ready for active service.

Few well-informed people are sure that the war will be over this summer. The best judgment seems to consider a 1918 campaign more than probable. So we ought to raise an Expeditionary Force of Half a Million — a real army, ready for service — within a year after the Declaration of War. Even if luck favors us and our transports do not have to sail, the fact that we have the men ready to embark will have an influence — perhaps the decisive influence — on determining whether 1918 shall be as blood-soaked as 1917 promises to be. And so if we are to exercise that influence on Germany next year we must begin organising our military force at once.

We do not want to repeat the blunder of falling into the Short War Fallacy. Whether we are going to need half a million men or ten million — a matter no one can predetermine — the preliminary work will be much the same. If we start out to raise an Army of Half a Million, it will take very little extra effort to prepare to double or quadruple it, if the need arises.

It is always easy to demobilise. But time once lost is never found again.

If the nation is grimly and passionately resolved to enforce its will, if the finances and industry of the country are efficiently mobilised, the raising and training of men is merely a matter of that sort of detail organisation at which we have always been expert. There is nothing mystic nor esoteric about military organisation.

First of all we must kill the "Business as usual" frame of mind. We must realise that it is not natural to be at war, that an upheaval — like the San

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Francisco Earthquake or the Galveston Tidal Wave — has overwhelmed our normal life, and that we must all turn out to build emergency shelters for what we hold dear. We must be willing to postpone usual business till the return of Peace. The speed and effectiveness with which we develop military power will depend entirely on how keenly we are determined to have it.

It is on the sea that our forces will first come into contact with the enemy. So the Navy must have the right of way in recruiting. We must give them all the men they need. The general public can have very little to say about Naval Strategy, for the Censorship abroad has been so strict in regard to Admiralty operations that the lessons of this two and a half years of sea war are not available for the layman. We must trust that our Admirals will be well advised by our Allies.

The Navy must also have the first call on our industrial resources. The ships which they need must be laid down at once and pushed to speedy completion. And in their building programme there must be plans for an adequate transport system for the Army when it is ready.

One branch of our Military strength is already fully trained and can be quickly mobilised. In our Corps of Army Engineers, and the men they have trained at Panama, we have a force immediately available, and there is no reason for them to stay at home in idleness waiting for us to develop an Army. There is not a General in the Entente forces who would not welcome an increase to his staff of engineers. On every front the "sappers" are overworked. Whether it is digging new trenches or draining water out of old ones, building roads or driving mines or laying concrete gun emplacements, there is endless

work for the engineers. Operations at Saloniki and Avlona would be immensely facilitated by harbor work. And every General Staff needs more railroads.

The need is greatest in Russia. Her entire transportation system is disorganised. She has the men for her Army, but lacks equipment. And she can only get the munitions over long, congested railroads. Stores are piled high at Archangel and Vladivostok. It is not a question of how much ammunition her allies can furnish her, but how much her railroads will carry from the ports to the firing line.

If our Engineers could put the Trans-Siberian Railroad on a basis of American efficiency it would be a greater blow to Germany's military dreams than any one other thing we might do.

This transportation tangle has been discussed in Russia since the outbreak of the war, but they were short of Engineers and needed those they had elsewhere — and they did not believe the War would

last very long. So the loan of a large force of expert American railroad men to Russia would be real efficiency, giving help where it was most needed. It might go a long way towards ending the war.

In the development of land forces the first need is proper facilities for speedy technical education. There is a wide difference of opinion on how many months of instruction it takes to prepare a private soldier, how many to fit a man for a commission. But of the two, the schooling of enlisted men takes less time. Therefore the creation of a corps of officers is the first step in raising an army. There is no gain in calling men away from industry and then holding them in camps through months of idleness because there is no one to train them. The importance of this point, while recognised by military men who have had actual experience with volunteer forces,

is perhaps not understood by the general public.

There is a ratio in any army between mouths and muskets. Take the British Army as an example, for it will be the same with ours. Its size can be stated as the number of men in uniform — the number of rations. But its strength depends on the number of men actually engaging the enemy — the number of rifles. Now, you can put as many men as you care to feed into uniform, but you can not send them into active service until they have proper leadership.

A lack of clear understanding of this point — or perhaps it was an effort to frighten the Germans with resounding numbers — has handicapped the British Army from the start. The first wave of volunteers utterly overwhelmed the small number of available officers. White-haired old gentlemen from the Reserve were set to work giving the recruits antiquated, pre-Boer War drill, and so

wasted months teaching them things they later had to unlearn. The training of officers on a large scale was not begun promptly. Always there were too many men. The Universal Conscription Bill was passed before the volunteer army was properly commanded. And it is doubtful if to-day the British have anything like enough officers for the vast number of men at their disposal.

If we decide to raise an Expeditionary Force of Half a Million — and we must do so unless we are willing to bet that Germany will be defeated this summer — the first thing is to begin intensive methods of teaching men how to lead them. And we will need at least 20,000 officers for our first contingent.

We have one great advantage over the British, our best men will not be sacrificed in the first month of war. Every British soldier who fell in the Retreat from Mons was sorely missed when it came to drilling "Kitchener's Mob."

Beside our Regular Army, we have an appreciable number of reserve and militia officers and many others who have had some preparation for command. Most of our State Universities have rudimentary military training and among those of their alumni who have been cadet officers some good material can be found. The State Governors should also be called on to put in motion the machinery they use for selecting candidates for West Point, and to send in nominations for the emergency. An executive order has already directed the selection of promising "non-coms" from the Regular Army — corporals and sergeants — for special work to fit them for commissions. Moreover since modern warfare tends like modern industry to specialisation and requires a large number of experts, it would be possible to take direct from our industrial life men who are technicians rather than soldiers, for command in special service corps. A captain in

an Aviation unit, for instance, has little need of knowing infantry drill regulations.

All these possible sources should be used intensively and intelligently. Within a couple of months we should have at least 30,000 men in the Officers' Training Corps.

One very obvious thing to do is to get expert advice from our friends. The Canadians have had actual experience in training volunteers. A large part in our drill courses should be directed by men who have been through the mill. None of our officers have more than a theoretic knowledge of "bombing," but the Canadians could lend us plenty of wounded men to teach us the tricks of that trade. The French are the best artillerists in the world and our service would profit greatly from French instruction.

And some of our own men, already schooled in theory, could at once be sent abroad for practice. A unit might be organised from the two upper classes at

West Point. They could rejoin our Army when it was ready to take the field, and their actual experience of warfare would be of immense value to our green troops.

But every effort to raise men should be postponed until the shortage in officers is overcome. If, for instance, it is estimated that it takes six months to break in enlisted men and nine months to qualify for a commission, the men should not be taken from industry till the Officers' Training Corps have had three months start. Our General Staff knows how many Lieutenants and Captains and Majors we will need and how long it will take to produce them, and it is on that basis that a date should be set for calling the men to the colors.

These more immediate things attended to, we must take up the question of how to raise men for the new Army. Here we

are at once in for a bitter discussion between the Conscriptionists and the partisans of Volunteer Service. Either system would give us more men than we could at present officer. But the problem we now have to face is an emergency problem. Actually at war, we have no time to argue the matter out. It is not a solution for all time which we are now seeking — but an immediate programme to meet an immediate need.

Extreme militarists and extreme democrats, Von Bernhardi and Jaurès, were agreed in favoring universal service. And if it is admitted that a large military establishment is necessary, Liberals, Socialists, Labor organisations the world over prefer a Citizens' Army. Opposition to Universal Military Service in the United States has been based on the belief that we did not need a large army. But our fundamental laws have always recognised the obligation of all citizens to rally for national defence. The President already has the right to "draft"

us in a crisis. So the Conscription laws now under consideration deal only with the detailed application of a long accepted principle.

But a system of Universal Military Service takes time to mature. We would not derive full benefit from it for a decade at least. And now we are not so much interested in a permament policy of National Defence, as concerned with the speedy development of a strong *offence.* The question before us is, how to bring the greatest pressure to bear on Germany immediately. And even our military men will admit that Conscription has its drawbacks as an emergency measure. Volunteering brings quicker results and, for a relatively small Army, has the advantage of taking first those who are most ready and free to go. To call out the "class," who have just reached military age, would be to neglect all the older trained, and half trained men, of the militia. Obviously that is unwise when we want an Army quickly.

Lack of officers will make it impossible for us to put more than half a million men in the field by 1918. We can raise that force by voluntary enlistment with little disturbance to our industrial life and no permanent change in national policy.

If a large Army is proved to be necessary by events, there is little dispute that Universal Service is the only democratic way to recruit it. But there is grave and sincere difference of opinion as to whether we will need a large and permanent Military force. If this War — as so many of us hope — is to result in a Peace League of the Nations, if the ideal which Mr. Wilson has set before us is even approximated, we will have no need of the largest Army in the world. And that is what the Swiss system of Military Service means for us — Ten Million trained soldiers.

Many of us who are passionately persuaded that we must now throw all our energy into the struggle to free Europe

from the Menace of Militarism feel that this moment is peculiarly ill chosen to begin to arm ourselves beyond the immediate need.

Never in the history of the world has there been better hope for some form of International Federation which will reduce Military establishments to police needs. It is not only the sentimental reaction from the horrors of this war, but the appalling financial burdens already fastened on Europe. There is a great element of our people, intensely patriotic in this crisis, fired by a willingness to meet any sacrifice in this war, who yet believe in a peace to come.

We may be forced to continue and intensify our armament, but as yet the hope for a better future is strong, the need is not yet obvious. Let us therefore avoid dissension by leaving this debate to the events. Let us not use the temporary crisis of this war as a pretext for deciding on policies for a dim and uncertain future.

Now we face an emergency. And in the immediate crisis volunteering would probably do as well as conscription, for if the men did not come forward quickly we would have to resort to "drafts." But the organisation of Universal Service takes time — and we want the Half Million men as quickly as possible.

And while it is quite probable that we may not need more than a Half Million — and even possible that we may not use them — there is always the chance that we may need very many more.

It is a chance which — even if it is only an off chance — we must at once prepare to meet. And we will have to resort to Universal Service if it proves necessary to raise more than a First Contingent. The preliminary plans for this larger structure should be begun at once.

The first step is a military and industrial census. One or two of the States have already undertaken such work, but it would be very much better

to centralise it under the already trained Census Bureau at Washington. Every resident of the United States over 16 should be required to register and should be given an Identity Book. There should be recorded: date and place of birth, nationality, date of naturalisation, mail address, trade, present occupation and previous military service. The material so collected would be digested by the Census Bureau. We would know how many men are 19 this year, how many reached military age in 1891, and so forth; how many are unemployed; how many men are doing work where women could be substituted; how many women are available for munition work; how many are engaged in vital industries, which must not be weakened; how many skilled mechanics, who are now at work on sewing machines, could be transferred to arsenals.

Such Census work, if it had been undertaken in England in the first months of the war would have been of immense

value. They did not think the w
would last so long. And when at leng
they undertook this work, it was do
by unskilled, volunteer census-take
hurriedly and ineffectually.

So without interfering with the wo
of intensifying our munition outp
or our ship-building programme, witho
interfering with the organisation
the Volunteer Expeditionary Force, th
work of taking a census of man-pow
should be begun at once. It is not sa
to bet that the War will be over th
summer and such knowledge as this cer
sus would give us must be the foundatio
for any further degree of mobilisation w
may have forced upon us.

In France there was some excuse fo
rushing the wrong men to the front
They thought they needed all the soldiers
they could get. But this precipitation
soon proved to have been a costly mis-
take.

Here is a case in point. Some research surgeons sent to France by the Rockefeller Institute wanted to experiment on a new disinfectant for wounds and the French Government gave them a hotel in Compiègne for their hospital. Now these scientists were very expert in laboratory methods but they had no experience in the housekeeping side of hospital management. They did not know how to run a laundry, they were not cooks and had no large experience in marketing. And their work at first was very seriously handicapped by difficulty over such details. But at last it occurred to one of them that this hotel, before it was requisitioned by the Government, must have had a manager. After some inquiries they discovered that the man was a common soldier in a regiment in the Argonne. With considerable trouble, and after tearing up much red tape, they had him sent back to Compiègne. And their worries were over. He brought order out of confusion in

twenty-four hours, and the wound soldiers who only the day before h suffered much needless misery were n vastly more comfortable.

The same situation existed in almo every hospital in France. Hotels h been requisitioned, but the men who kn how to run them efficiently were - if they had not already fallen — "som where" at the front. But if the Frenc once see a mistake they are quick t remedy it. And the improvement i the hospital at Compiègne was s marked that a general order was sen out calling home men who knew how t manage the domestic economy of hos pitals.

And in these two and a half years o war the same thing has been repeated over and over again. Men with special capacity for some vitally important job at home have been wasted in the training camps and in the trenches. The British now are sorting out their coal miners and sending them home. One group of

French specialists after another has been demobilised. And all this means needless dislocation — sheer waste.

Let us profit by this experience. We can trust to luck and individual patriotism for the first Half Million. But if we need more than that we will have to choose them with care.

CHAPTER VI

A PROGRAMME

OUR Government has had more than two years to watch the great democracies of Europe struggling with the problems of mobilisation. And bearing these lessons in mind we have a right to demand two things:

A CLEAR CALL TO ARMS. There must be a comprehensible, sincere and inspiring statement of why we are asked to fight. The issue must be put simply and concisely, in terms which will reach all our people. The issue must be put honestly. If there are good reasons for us to fight, the more completely the Administration takes us into its confidence the better. And to be inspiring, the Call to

Arms must be infused with the passionate idealism of Democracy.

It must be made clear that we are fighting neither for our own aggrandisement nor to further the ambitions of any nation against another. There must be guarantees that our war is being waged neither for the greater profit of the munition makers, nor to fasten a permanent militarism upon us. Only on a platform of broad human rights, only with Just Peace for the World set as a goal, can the whole nation be rallied.

Unless the spirit of our people can be thoroughly mobilised our warfare will be petty and degrading.

A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION. The Will to Win will weaken in idleness. Mobilisation is activity — tense, determined, sustained activity. There should therefore be published at once — and some one has been remiss if it is not ready — a detailed plan of mobilisation.

First of all this plan should answe every man and woman in our land question: "What can I do?" E one of us, in one way or another, sho contribute something to the national fort. And we have a right to exp that the Government shall direct o willingness to serve into fruitful cha nels. Those of us who are not show something to do will be getting in th way.

And secondly the Programme of Mobilisation should be so framed that we can check up its progress. For only under the constant pressure of Public Opinion will it be possible to keep the work from flagging. The most rapid progress will be made in those departments in which we are most keenly interested. Graft and laziness and red-tape obstructionism — all the ills of bureaucracy — flourish on public indifference. We want our experts to tell us what is needed and what to look for in the way of fulfilment. And if our hopes

are deceived, we want to know the reason why. We have a right to expect:

Within One Week after the outbreak of hostilities:

1. That the Navy is at work.
2. That our ship-yards are busy on a coherent, co-ordinated programme of construction. Battleships, submarines, sub-chasers, freight-ships and *transports.*
3. That our financial resources are mobilised, that the credit of the nations fighting with us against Germany is re-established on the par exchange, and that we, as a nation, have ceased to make profit out of the needs of our Comrades already in arms.
4. That plans have been matured for the mobilisation of Capitalists, Technicians and Wage Workers for increased production in all war industries, and that the whole en-

terprise of munition making has been put on a basis of fair wages and fair profits.

Within Three Months:

1. That an Emergency War Cabinet has been created, which will inspire national confidence by the renowned honesty and efficiency of its members, and that majorities have been organised in both Houses of Congress, representing the National Unity in the face of this emergency — not a coalition of the two old parties, but the coalescence of all patriots, a crystallisation of the National Will to Win.
2. That our munition output has doubled and is steadily increasing, and that the problems of distribution and transportation of supplies has been worked out.
3. That our Army Engineers and the civilian staff they trained at Pan-

ama are at work on the Trans-Siberian Railroad or on similar undertakings abroad.

4. That our school camps for the intensive training of officers are in full swing, that a course of instruction based on the experience of this war has been worked out, and that peace time red tape and seniority rules in the high command have been replaced by promotion regulations based on ability, so that every private soldier carries a general's epaulettes in his knapsack.
5. That quarters and training facilities have been arranged for the first Half Million volunteers, the recruiting started and the date when the men will be called to the colors announced.
6. That the census work, which must be the basis of any future conscription, is under way.

Within One Year:

1. That 500,000 men are trained, equipped and officered and that *transports are ready for them.*
2. That plans are perfected for the training of officers and the recruitment of our Army by the just and democratic method of conscription, up to whatever degree of mobilisation shall prove necessary.

At the end of the first year of war we will have a right to expect that a good beginning has been made, that the enemy has begun to feel the pressure of our intervention and that all the preliminary plans are laid to go as far in arming as any one cares to force us.

And we have a right to demand that the Government's programme shall show that the lessons of the European War have been studied, and that the now obvious blunders, which retarded mobilisation in France and Britain, are to be

avoided. We do not want our thinking befogged by unnecessary limitation of free discussion by an arbitrary censor. We ought not to stumble into the Short War Fallacy. We should avoid all friction with our Comrades in Arms due to ambiguity in the definition of our war aims. Our warfare must not be interrupted by justified strikes in the munition industries. And we do not want to have our enthusiasm for a War of Liberation dampened by an even apparent triumph of the anti-democratic forces at home.

Above all we have a right and duty to demand that the Government's programme of mobilisation shall be free from bluff.

"Bluff" is an American word. The Germans, while themselves given to bluffing, are disposed to call. They called the bluff at Gallipoli. They called the bluff at Saloniki. They called the Roumanian bluff. And now they will not be the least bit frightened by Mr. Bryan's

idea of a million patriots springing to arms over night. They are afraid neither of pitch-forks nor bare fists. Whatever we may announce, they will force a show-down.

And it is equally important not to bluff on account of our Comrades in Arms. This War is — whether we like it or not — making us a member of the World Council. We have a reputation of Spread Eagle bombast to live down. And it will be very much better for us to perform more than we promise than to fall below the expectations we raise.

Let us harness the cart of our aspirations to the stars, but keep our promises down to earth. The Government's programme should be modest, realisable — sober.

That many details of this programme may be unwise, I would be the first to admit. But that some such programme of energy, of action, is necessary, cannot be disputed by any one who is not

willing to bet everything on the chance that the war will be over this summer.

Roumania obviously thought the war was almost over — bet and lost.

Why should we fall prey to this Short-War Fallacy?

If — happily — the war ends quickly, it will not be hard for us to de-mobilise and go back to our jobs. But if the war lasts it will be utterly impossible for us to make up for lost time.

THE END

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